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NOTES
TROUBLE BEGINS IN THE "NEW" SHERMAN ACT:
THE PERPLEXING STORY OF THE A&P CASE:
Tim recently expanded concept of "monopoly power" has given new life
to Section 2 of the Sherman Act.' The line of cases culminating in 1948 with
Schine and Griffith 2 established the view that power to control a market
can violate the law, regardless of the ways in which it was acquired or used.3
The new doctrine seems well founded. Past history cannot indicate whether
or not a market is effectively competitive now, nor whether it will be in the
future. These issues depend on the existence of a monopoly power which
can be used to raise price, pummel equally efficient competitors, or ke ep
newcomers out of the field.
However, the new doctrine does not abolish the "rule of reason." It gives
the courts no magic formula to substitute for the exercise of judgment.
Courts must still decide what kind and degree of economic power is incon-
sistent with the broad purposes of the Act. Most economic markets contain
elements of monopoly, and yet many of those same markets are for all prac-
tical purposes quite competitive. 4 Not only are many monopoly elements
relatively harmless; in some settings they may actually invigorate competi-
tion in product and price. 5 The lure of temporary monopoly profits is an
* United States v. N.Y. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 173 F2d 79 (7th Cir.
1949), affirming 67 F.Supp. 626 (E.D.Ill.1946).
1. 26 STAT. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. §2 (1946). See Rostow, The Mew Sheiran
Act: A Positive Instrument of Progress, 14 U. oF Cir, L. RPm. 567 (1947); Monopoly
under the Sherman Act: Power or Purpose? 43 ILs. L. Rmy. 745 (1949).
2. Schine Theatres, Inc. v. United States, 334 U.S. 110 (1948); United States v.
Griffith, 334 U.S. 100 (1948) ; United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131
(1948) ; American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781 (1946) ; United States v.
Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
3. ".. . [M]onopoly power, whether lawfully or unlawfully acquired, may itself
constitute an evil and stand condemned under § 2 even though it remains unexercised.
For § 2 of the Act is aimed, inter alia, at the acquisition or retention of effective mar-et
control." United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 107 (1948). See LoNG-w:zn, Tim LAW
op Fro= ENTmRPsE 212-8 (1949).
The market may be a very small part of the "national market." United States v.
Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218, 226 (1947) ; Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. American
Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219, 236 (1948) ; Schine and Grifflth cases, stpra note 2.
And see United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495, 519 (1948).
The element of "intent" has become e-tremely circumscribed. See Rostow, Monopoly
Under the Sherman Act: Power or Purpose? 43 IL. L. R a. 745, 770-2 (1949).
4. See EDWARDs, MAInTAMING Cosm'Ermox 6-7 (1949); Adelman, Effective
Competition and the Antitrust Laws, 61 I-Ltv. L. R-v. 12S9, 1-9,1304 (1943) ; Comment,
Price Systems and Competition: The Basing Point IssuWs, 58 YAMX L. J. 426, 429-30
(1949).
5. See Adelman, supra note 4, at 1300, 1303 rn 35.
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important impetus to the introduction of new products and new techniques,
which rudely upset the peaceful, profitable existence of long-entrenched
business firms. 6 This constant change to the new, the more efficient, is the
very heart of the process of effective competition. Unless read and applied
in the light of its broad purposes, therefore, the "New Sherman Act" may
develop a serious contradiction.
The chance that the Act may be mechanically applied to stifle competi-
tive forces is increased by the fact that vigorous competition is not a friendly
pastime. New methods of production and distribution not only disturb
existing firms; they frequently demolish them. It then becomes much too
easy to identify the demise of these beleaguered competitors with a decline
in competition itself, particularly where the attackers are large and powerful.
It is even easier when other laws like the Robinson-Patman Act,, largely the
products of the inherently destructive competition of depression days4
implicitly make just that identification.
Passed in 1936, the Robinson-Patman Act severely restricts direct and
indirect price discrimination,8 and forbids the payment of brokerage to any
buyer who deals directly with a seller. 9 For whom and for what purpose
was the statute passed? It came to the aid of producers of foods, drugs and
other soft goods who were being driven into substantial price reductions by
chain stores, mail order houses and department stores. But the main in-
tended beneficiaries of the Act were the multitude of brokers, jobbers, whole-
salers and small retailers whom the large buyers were short-circuiting out of
the distribution business. In short, the Robinson-Patman Act was another
in a series of attempts to stave off cost-cutting methods of distribution. 10 It
thus serves to fortify the anti-competitive side of the New Sherman Act.
Until. recently, cases under the Sherman Act have not presented this
6. See, e.g., ScHumPETER, CAPITALIsM, SoCIALI.S AND DEMoc AcY c. VIII (2d
ed. 1947), particularly at 89-92, 106. For a more skeptical view, see Brown, Adverlising
and the Public Interest: Legal Protection of Trade Symbols, 57 YALE L. J. 1165, 1177-9
(1948).
7. 49 STAT. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1946).
8. 49 STAT. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. §§13 (a),(b),(d),(e) (1946).
9. 49 STAT. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13 (c) (1946).
10. See generally McNair, Marketing Functions and Costs and the Robinson-Patina
Act, 4 LAW & CONTEMi'. PRoB. 334 (1937) ; Burns, The Anti-Trust Laws and the Regi.
lation of Price Competition, 4 LAw & CoNTEMP. PRoD. 301, 307, 316-8 (1937) ; Learned
& Isaacs, The Robinson-Patinan Law: Some Assumptions and Expectations, 15 HAV.
Bus. REv. 137 (1937) ; Edwards, The Place of Economics in the Course on Trade Regula.
tion, 1 J. or LxAL ED. 1, 7 (1948).
The drive to "equalize" (end?) price competition is a powerful one, It reached its
zenith as a national policy in the NRA. But with NRA gone, the Miller-Tydings Act,
the state "fair trade" laws, and laws prohibiting "sales below cost" continue to give strong
support to anti-competitive forces. See Shulman, The Fair Trade Acts and the Law of
Restrictive Agreements Affecting Chattels, 49 YALE L.J. 607 (1940); GRnErn, PzucE
CONTROL UNDER FAIR TRADE LEGIsr..ATION (1939) ; Comment, Sales Below Cost Prohibi-
tions: Private Price Fixing under State Law, 57 YALE L. 3. 391 (1948).
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problem. When the courts looked at monopoly power in the Alcoa, Tobacco
and Movie cases," they were dealing with power that shackled the forces
of a free market. But in United States v. N. Y. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea
Co., 12 the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has upheld a criminal
conviction in a situation where the defendant corporation represented the
forces of competition, efficiency and change. The potential contradiction in
the New Sherman Act is sharply exposed.
A&P is an integrated system, admittedly powerful enough to affect the
various markets in which it operates as buyer and seller. To supply its
retail stores, which in 1943 sold some 7 per cent of all groceries, 1" A&P main-
tains warehouses, manufacturing establishments and an extensive buying
organization. A subsidiary, the Atlantic Commission Company (ACCO),
is the largest single buyer in the fresh produce markets, and supplies both
A&P and independent dealers.'
4
As did the district court,'- the Seventh Circuit stated that neither size,
through vertical and horizontal integration, nor "the power that may rightly
go with such size and integration" was necessarily illegal'10 The question,
said the court, was whether A&P's activities amounted to an "abuse of that
power." 17
In its buying program, A&P wielded the persuasive power of its patronage
to beat down prices, and obtained concessions which often were not extended
to its competitors. When suppliers proved unduly adamant, the Company
occasionally suggested that it might manufacture the product itself. The
concessions were obtained in several forms. Since A&P dealt directly with
suppliers, it at one time secured brokerage allowances. After the Robinson-
Patman Act ended this practice, A&P induced suppliers to reduce the net
price by the amount of the brokerage. When the FTC terminated that
dodge,'5 the Company preferred suppliers who made all sales direct-to the
vast discomfiture of discarded brokers.
A&P also insisted on quantity discounts, often on a scale not demonstrably
related to the seller's cost savings. As a result, according to the court,
.. the supplier had to make his profits out of other customers' higher
11. See note 2 supra.
12. 173 F.2d 79 (7th Cir. 1949), afflrming 67 F.Supp. 626 (E.D.II.1946).
13. 67 F.Supp. 626, 633 (E.D.I.1946). Except as noted, the facts of the case de-
scribed in succeeding paragraphs are drawn from the opinion of the court of appeals.
14. 67 F.Supp. 626, 634 (E.D.III.1946) ; HoF Amx, LArGE-SCALE Or;A::izATxo0. n:
THE FooD I.-wusmrms 54 (TNEC Monograph 35, 1940) (hereinafter referred to as Hor -
M.ANr).
15. 67 F.Supp. 626, 642 (E.D.Ill.1946).
16. 173 F2d 79, 82 (7th Cir. 1949).
17. Ibid. The court in this respect appeared to be eschewing the new doctrine of
monopoly power under Section 2. See note 3 supra. But when it got around to draving
legal conclusions, it cited the new cases liberally. See p. 973 infra.
18. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. FTC, 106 F-2d 667 (3d Cir. 1939), cerl.
denied, 308 U.S. 625 (1940). Paradoxically, the brokerage clause was first applied
against the collective buying agencies of small buyers. Biddle Purchasing Co. v. FTC,
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prices." 11 The Company obtained advertising allowances from some manu-
facturers. These were said to be discriminatory and in excess of A&P's
actual expenditures. Moreover, A&P took no pains to broadcast any con-
cessions it obtained. It had a healthy respect for the Robinson-Patman Act,
and in most contracts it compelled suppliers to insert a clause that they
would offer the same terms to other buyers.2 0
ACCO emulated its parent in putting pressure on suppliers for better
price and delivery terms. The court was particularly disturbed over ACCO's
double role as buyer for A&P and seller to the trade. Since ACCO "increased
the price to competitors" by collecting brokerage, A&P got a "competitive
advantage" in price.21 Also ACCO retained the best quality produce for
A&P, selling the inferior to others.
On the selling side of the market, the Company was said to use its ad.
vantage in buying to undersell competitors wherever it chose. Moreover, it
lowered its gross profit rates in many areas to gain additional volume at the
expense of competitors. 22 Occasionally the gross rates were so low that stores
appeared to sell below cost for varying periods of time. It was an "almost
irresistible conclusion," the court stated, that A&P could compensate for
any reduction in profits in one area by raising the price in other areas.23
In what respects do any or all of these buying and selling activities violate
the Sherman Act? The district court, after a bow to A&P's part in getting
distribution costs down, had seized on ACCO as the "rotten thread" which
made all other activities, legal as they may have been standing alone, take
on a "polluted colored light." 24 This conclusion, though admirably pic-
turesque, was not particularly enlightening.
The Seventh Circuit was more explicit. First, A&P's threats to withdraw
business from suppliers who wouldn't cut price were boycotts and per so
illegal. 25 Second, the advantage which A&P gained through preferences
illegal under the Robinson-Patman Act was also an "unlawful restraint in
itself." 5 Third, the "chain reaction" of A&P's illegally-used buying power,
permitting "selling below cost" and hence more buying power, could not
96 F.2d 687 (2d Cir. 1938), cert. denied, 305 U.S. 634 (1938); Oliver Bros. V. FTC, 102
F.2d 763 (4th Cir. 1939).
19. 173 F.2d 79, 83 (7th Cir. 1949).
On the legitimacy of quantity discounts under the Robinson-Patman Act, see FTC
v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37, 42-4 (1948).
20. 67 F.Supp. 626, 648-9 (E.D.Ill.1946).
21. 173 F.2d 79, 85 (7th Cir. 1949).
22. "If Area X is having a tough experience competitionwise, or the area looks pro-
spective [sic] in which to increase the volume of business, the gross profit percentage in
this area is lowered. This lowers the price at which goods may be sold and the volume
increases at the expense of somebody." 173 F.2d 79, 87 (7th Cir. 1949).
23. Id. at 87.
24. 67 F.Supp. 626, 678 (E.D.Ill.1946).
25. 173 F2d 79, 87 (7th Cir. 1949), citing inter alia Fashion Originators' Guild v.
FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941).
26. 173 F2d 79, 88 (7th Cir. 1949).
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help but "tend toward monopoly" and conceivably "ultimate extinction"
of competitorsY While a showing of actual exclusion of competitors was
not necessary under Section 2, the court stated, the record showed "howv
some local grocers were quickly eliminated" when set upon by A&P "armed
with its monopoly power." 21 On these grounds, the court held that A&P
violated both Sections 1 and 2 of the Act, citing the Tobacco, Paramount,
Scaline and Griffith cases.2- Thus, a discussion of "abuses" was transformed
into an application of New Sherman Act doctrine. cl
If the logic of the cases relied on were followed to the end, a civil suit
would shortly be in order. The way to cure monopoly power is to dissolve
its base, and divestiture, rather than a mere fine, would be the fate of A&P.
But is this really an appropriate answer? Some 15 years ago, an ardent
advocate of enforcing competition called chain stores a new weapon against
monopolistic restraints.3 ' A&P's activities deserve closer scrutiny.
It is clear enough that A&P's buying program caused considerable distress
among suppliers and competing distributors. But were the Company's
activities unjustifiable? Certainly the attempts to secure the advantages of
direct dealing rested on good reason, Robinson-Patman Act to the contrary.
A&P dealt directly with suppliers, presumably because this was cheaper
than buying through brokers. Suppliers in turn saved brokerage expense on
these direct sales. Hence, to compel A&P to pay the same price to the sup-
plier that his brokers charged to others on resale would make A&P the victim
of price discrimination, give the supplier a windfall profit, and preserve
costly methods of distribution as a charge on consumers.' 2 A&P's later
shift toward suppliers who made all sales direct was calculated to avoid such
results, and is no more open to criticism than its earlier methods.
27, Ibid.
28. Ibid.
29. See note 2 stpra.
30. The emphasis on "abuses," "threats," and ungentlemanly behavior was a strong,
and occasionally dominant, element in the older Sherman Act cases. See Lo.rmo, op.
cit. supra note 3; Rostow, supra note 3, at 776. But it is unnecessary in considering
whether Section 2, as newly defined, has been violated. The outcome of the Grifflth case
was identical with that of the Schine case; yet Griffith, unlike Sizin, contained no
evidence whatsoever of pressuring tactics. Schine Theatres, Inc. v. United States, 334
U.S. 110, 115-6 (1948); United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 104 (1943).
31. "The unfortunately vde differentiation betwreen wholesale and retail prices, and
the sharp separation between wholesale and retail markets, may be regarded as a vestigial
remainder of the mercantilist system (as a colossal system of restraint upon trade) which
has only recently begun to be undermined. The growth of mail-order houses and of large-
scale retailing through chain stores is salutary and (given not too much foolish legisla-
tion) abundantly promising-offering great economies through increase in the size of
units, and without raising any real problem of monopoly!' Siruon s, A Posruva PnownAz
Fop LAissEz FAme 33 (1934) (italics added).
32. See EDwApms, lAInTAING Coprr Iri'xo 169 (1949); Note, The Bro.crage
Provision of the Robinson-Patnan Act, 47 YAm L.J. 1207 (1933); Phillips, The
Robinson-Patman Anti-Price Discrimination Law and tMe Chain; Store, 15 HA v. Bus.
REv. 62, 66-7, 73-4 (1936).
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A&P's aggressive buying policy inevitably resulted at times in other con-
cessions-advertising 13 and quantity discount allowances-not available to
its competitors on the same terms. While these differentials of course con-
tributed to the difficulty of competing with A&P, the contribution was a
minor one.14 Moreover, in the market context involved, the behavior of
A&P and other large buyers was beneficial to price competition. It is highly
unrealistic to conclude that when a seller gives a lower price to one buyer
he must thereupon raise the price to others. The argument makes two
assumptions: that the seller could have charged others a higher price to
begin with and for some unknown reason failed to do so; and that in lowering
the price to an obstreperous buyer he is selling at a loss. Neither assumption
is justified. What is overlooked is that the seller himself must be operating
in an imperfectly competitive market to have such control of his price, and
that a large buyer like A&P is forcing him to take less in the way of profits
on new sales that he would like to get.35
In this kind of situation, therefore, there is no good reason to call a refusal
to buy or a "threat" to manufacture an illegal boycott, which until this
case has meant an attempt to raise prices or exclude people from a market!10
33. An expanded analysis of advertising allowances-as part of a thoroughgoing
criticism of the A&P case-is presented in Adelman, The A&P Case: A Study it
Applied Economic Theory (to be published in a forthcoming issue of the QUARTERLY
JouRAL OF EcoxoMics). Generally, while excessive advertising allowances are a form of
price concession, in part at least they represent a joint enterprise on the part of A&P
and the producer of branded products to make advertising at the retail level perform a
double function. The result is savings in costs, which, if split, benefit both the supplier
and A&P. Even if A&P gets them all, the supplier is no worse off-and in any event
the consumer pays a lower advertising bill. In some cases where A & P got higher allow-
ances than its competitors, it was apparently a better salesman and in that sense deserved
them. The Government itself took pains to prove that the Company expanded the slles of
some branded items much faster than did other distributors. Brief for the United States,
p. 369, United States v. N.Y. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 173 F.2d 79 (7th Cir.
1949).
34. An analysis of the data presented in FTC, CHAIN STOMS: FINAL REroRT ON
THE CHAIN STORE INVEsTIGATION (1935), indicated that the buying advantage of grocery
chains after all discounts averaged only 1.73 per cent of cost price. The advantage se-
cured by "special" discounts-promotional, volume, and brokerage allowances-,was only
0.45 per cent of cost price. Phillips, .rupra note 32, at 63-4. This is but a small fraction
of the amount by which chains undersell small independents at the retail level:
"... [E]ven if all these special concessions had not existed, the methods of chain
store operation are such that the chains would still have possessed some 80% to 90% of
their total price advantage over the independent." Id. at 67. See also HOFFMAN, at 106,
and notes 43-4 infra.
35. See Adelman, .rupra note 4, at 1331.
One of the leading pre-Robinson-Patman Act cases on price discrimination provides
clear-cut evidence on the point. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. FTC, 101 F.2d 620 (6th
Cir. 1939). The company made a net profit of $7.7 million on sales of $116 million worth
of tires to Sears Roebuck during the years 1926-33. This was considerably less than the
$20.4 million net profit on sales of the same amount to others, but it was still a comfort-
able profit by any standards. Id. at 622.
36. In Fashion Originators' Guild v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457, 461-2 (1941), the Guild
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No seller would heed these pressures unless he thought his price could be
beaten by other sellers or by A&P's own manufacturing. And if his price
could be beaten, it is in the nature of competition that it should come down.
Actually, buyer-instigated price discrimination exerts downward pressure
on general price levels. A price reduction to one buyer has what for the seller
is a most unfortunate tendency to spread, as the long history of frantic
efforts to stamp out price discrimination will testify.n' It may be safely
surmised that the purveyors of branded products, failing in their efforts to
prevent price concessions, were far more anxious than A&P to keep them
secret.
When sellers themselves are powerful, they deserve few tears merely
because of pressure or threats by equally powerful buyers. Small unor-
ganized suppliers of unbranded items, little known brands or fresh produce
can be exploited by large buyers, but there was little evidence of such ex-
ploitation here. Small manufacturers could gain from transactions with
A&P and ACCO a direct market for all or a large percentage of their output,
with consequent reduction of sales expenditures.-s Was ACCO or A&P able
to make them pay too heavily for this advantage? Not unless suppliers had
no place else to go, and this was not true. ACCO and A&P were not the
only buyers in their respective markets,^ and there is no claim that either
members attempted to drive out of business those manufacturers who copied their dress
styles and sold them at much lower prices. The same issues were involved in the colorful
case of Millinery Creators' Guild v. FTC, 109 F.2d 175 (2d Cir. 1940), where, as one
witness put it, the goal was ". . . raising the prices for a better grade milliner because,
for instance, the average milliner 15 years ago easily got $,30 for every hat they sold,
today the God damn thing sells for $1.95, I mean, they sell for $1.95 around tow .. :'
Id. at 178. See also Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945), where AP
by-laws empowered members to obstruct the admission of non-member competitors, and
AP's importance in the newsgathering field put non-members at a noticeable competitive
disadvantage.
Another recent case involving illegal boycotts found traditional distributing groups
combining with manufacturers to force cut-rate liquor vendors (A&,P's counterparts in
the field of potables) into abiding by resale price maintenance agreements. United States
v. Frankfort Distilleries, 324 U.S. 293 (1945).
37. See, e.g., Sugar Institute v. United States, 297 U.S. 553 (1936), analyzed in Fly,
Obsereatipns on the Anti-Trust Laws, Econonzic Theory a;:d the Sugar Institute Cases,
45 YALE L.J. 1339 (1936). See also PEAzcr, TRA E AssocrArxo:; Stiwvy 50, 77--, 81-2,
113-6 (TNEC Monograph 18, 1941); Comment, Price Systems and Conpetition: T:c
Basing Point Issues, 58 YA E L.J. 426, 433, 436 (1949).
"... [I]n industries in which concerns are relatively few and large, competition often
takes the form of secret price concessions, which are likely to be discriminatory in char-
acter; and the effort to stamp out competition often consists primarily in attempts to re-
quire uniform methods of pricing." EDwARDs, M =AMTA NfG CoxrEro:i 167-S (1949).
38. On output contracts generally, see Stockhausen, The Commercial ard Anti-Trust
Aspects of Term Requirement Contracts, 23 N.Y.U.L.Q.REv. 412 (1948). On their ad-
vantages for sellers, see id. at 414.
39. Nationally, A&P makes around 7 per cent of grocery sales. 67 F.Supp. 626,
633 (E.D.Il1l1946). ACCO in 1940 handled 11.6 per cent of the products in which it
dealt, the various fruit and vegetable crops. Id. at 634. Unfortunately, there are no
19491
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was in collusion with any other buyers. 0 Hence the power to "exploit"
suppliers was limited by the terms which those suppliers could get else-
where. 1 The only real danger in this situation is that small suppliers who
sell a large part of their output to A&P for a continued period thereby lose
other business contacts and a measure of their independence.42 A "cost-of-
shifting" margin is created, within which A&P could drive a hard bargain.
However, this is a risk common to all output arrangements.
In general, A&P's buying activities cannot cause undue concern, dis-
turbing as they may have been in the food markets. They are the kind to be
expected from active competition. As indicated, A&P often secured better
prices than its competitors through use of its buying power and the ability
to be all over the market at once. Yet its chief competitive advantages in
selling stem from quite different factors.
The retailing superiority of A&P-and other chains-is due primarily to
the efficiencies of streamlined distribution channels,4" supposedly not under
attack, and to the low-gross high-volume selling policy, 44 which definitely
figures as to particular regional or local buying markets. It may be safely assumed, how-
ever, that in none does A&P or ACCO have a monopoly position. For further discussion,
see notes 40 and 52 infra.
40. Contrast, in this respect, the "parallel" or "concerted" action on the part of
buyers in Mandeville Island Farms v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219, 240
(1948), and American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 800-1 (1946).
Percentage of the market is a quite insufficient indication of the actual control which
a firm enjoys, or of the role which that control actually.plays in a market. See Rostow,
Monopoly Under the Sherman Act: Power or Purpose? 43 ILL. L. Rv. 749, 779-82
(1949).
41. "It is of some significance in this connection that most of the chains manage to
retain more or less permanent connections with those from whom they buy. This state-
ment applies not only to food processors but also to farmers and local shippers who sell
direct to them. Criticisms against the mass bayer come more often from those who do
not sell to them than from those who do. It is, after all, to the advantage both of the
mass buyers and their suppliers to retain semipermanent and more or less amicable re-
lationships. Generally speaking, the mass buyer today places less emphasis on trying to
drive shrewd bargains here and there, and more on building up steady sources of supply
on a price basis which insures their permanence." HOFFMAN, at 106-7. (Italics added).
42. "In selling to a particular chain .... [the small supplier] has perhaps given tip
his other trade connections, and these cannot be renewed quickly if his arrangement with
the mass buyer is no longer satisfactory to him. It would probably be incorrect, however,
to exaggerate this disadvantage, since any seller no matter how small can usually find
some sort of outlet for his product through brokers and other specialized middlemen
of this sort." HOFFMAN, at 106.
43. Perhaps the outstanding saving is the elimination of several stages of selling
costs, which become superfluous with vertical integration. See SHEPHERD, MAnItIZrINO
FARMi PRODUCTS 392 (1946). Other savings include more efficient use of transportation
and warehousing facilities, better utilization of labor, elimination of credit, delivery and
clerk services, and more efficient and specialized management. See generally HOFFMAN,
at 66-74.
44. "The retail margin is usually the largest single element in the cost of food distribu-
tion, and often it is larger than all other transportation and marketing costs combined.
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was. It is difficult to understand why the latter should be so castigated by
the Government and the court. Admittedly, it may be hard at times to
draw the line between "predatory" and "competitive" price-cutting. This
is particularly true where an integrated concern, with sizeable financial
resources, is involved. 45 It may be, therefore, that in certain instances A&P's
price-cutting went beyond what might be considered fair. But if so, neither
the Government nor the court made a careful selection."
The general broadside against A&P's reduction of gross profit rates is a
direct attack on the competitive process. Assume that A&P operated some
stores at a loss until gain in volume made the low gross rate profitable.
Ultimate success proves only that the old high-gross low-volume method
was a highly inefficient way to sell groceries. Does the Government or the
court feel that business should never risk a loss for the sake of ultimate gain?
If so, a good share of competition must be consigned to limbo. Perhaps
Because their operations have been primarily in this phase of distribution, the innovations
made by the grocery chains probably have been more important from the standpoint of
reducing food costs than those made by other types of large-scale food concerns:' HoFr-
AxSA, at 158. See also id., at 60-3.
45. A large concern, if it is willing to stand the losses, can outlast a less affluent
competitor. Even if it has not entered on a calculated campaign of elimination, mere
inertia in applying accounting checks may carry price competition beyond the point to
which small independent units could go. But speculation is not proof, and extreme care
is necessary to avoid classing genuine price competition with attempts to monopolize:
"The competitor who finds it difficult to meet another's price may v'ell believe that
his rival intends to eliminate him, but this conviction cannot be taken as sufficient proof
of such intent. Every act of competition is designed to attract business to one competitor
rather than another and, to that e-tent, eliminate the latter from the market." Wi.cox,
Co ranrriox AND MlONOPOLY ix AfnIcAN IxDusTRY 6 (TNEC Monograph 21, 1940).
46. Justice Douglas' treatment of the price-cutting charge in the Schlne case is an
appropriate contrast:
'... [F]acts and circumstances must be adduced to show that it was in purpose or
effect employed as an instrument of monopoly power. Here there is nothing except a bare
finding that at times Schine cut admission prices. That finding is not sufficiently dis-
criminating to withstand analysis and is not adequate to support an injunction against price-
cutting." Schine Theatres, Inc. v. United States, 334 U.S. 110, 120-1 (1948).
47. Consider the following argument: "Of course, the lowering of gross profit rates
may ultimately result in increased sales and hence in increased profits. But appellants'
argument here wholly ignores the restraining effect upon A&P's retail competition dur-
ing the interval required for increased sales to reduce the expense rate. ' Brief for the
United States, p. 384, 173 F2d 79 (7th Cir. 1949). A&P's eloquent objection to this
theory has more to it than the mock astonishment of an advocate. Reply Brief for
Appellants, Part II, p. 469, ibid. The theory would apply to any manufacturer who re-
duced his price in order to get the low costs of mass-production, and to the main basis for
the efficiencies of large-scale retailing. How else can volume production or sales, and the
lower costs attendant thereon, be gained save by reducing price? Only by advertising,
and consumers bear enough advertising burdens without having a new theory that re-
quires more. See Brown, supra note 6, passim.
The Government's theory is strongly reminiscent of perennial business attempts to
keep prices above "average costs" so that all can make a profit; and it is close to the
philosophy of fixed retail mark-ups contained in resale price maintenance and "sales be-
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they were misled by "mere size" after all, and price reductions which would
not have raised an eyebrow if considered individually, somehow acquired
an aura of illegality when practised by one big firm.
Equally confounding is the notion that A&P used one or more parts of
its system to "subsidize" others. There were three variations on this theme.
In one, advanced by the Government but apparently avoided by the Seventh
Circuit, the "profits" on "sales" by ACCO and A&P's factories to A&P's
own stores were claimed to "subsidize" the retail operations." The argu-
ment is fancy. In an integrated concern there are no true profits until after
the product is finally sold to consumers. Intra-company transfers are merely
accounting transactions. If A&P's coffee company makes coffee at a cost of
25c a pound and the coffee is retailed at 30, it makes no difference whether
the item is transferred at 29, so that manufacturing "profit" is high, or at 26,
so that retail "profit" is high. The true profit-or loss-can be determined
only by considering the Company's operations as a whole.
In the second "subsidy" argument, the court asserted that ACCO's
"profits" on sales to independent dealers went "into A&P's coffers to in-
crease its competitive advantage." 41 Part of these "profits" were the cost
of services rendered, which dealers would have h id to pay for elsewhere if
ACCO were not there. As for the remainder, A&P had invested money in
ACCO and investments are expected to earn returns. What if A&P sold that
part of ACCO which dealt with independents and invested the proceeds in
securities-would the dividends then be considered a subsidy to the retail
stores? Both this and the first subsidy argument approach saying that
vertical integration is illegal per se. 0
The last variation was that losses in some retail divisions were covered by
low cost" statutes. See note 9 supra. And see Adelman, The A&P Case: A Sludy in
Applied Economic Theory (to be published in a forthcoming issue of the QuARTERLY
JOURNAL OF EcoNomics).
Of course A&P "manipulated" gross profit rates among various divisional areas-
i.e., changed the rates at different times, and had differing rates at the same time. But
this in itself proves nothing. If, to use the court's words, an area "is having a tough ex-
perience competitionwise," one would expect the Company to lower its prices. The Gov-
ernment cited A&P's New England division as an instance of lowered gross profit rates
from 1932 to 1936. Brief for the United States, pp. 94-101, 173 F.2d 79 (7th Cir.
1949). Actually the trouble was strenuous competition on the part of First National
Stores. During those years, First National's sales rose from $101 to $121 million, while
A&P's fell from $104 to $93 million. Reply Brief for Appellants, Part II, p. 451, ibid.
48. Brief for the United States, pp. 73-5, ibid. The Government appears to retreat
from the argument subsequently, id., at 363, 372, perhaps because of impressive attacks by
A&P, Reply Brief for Appellants, Part I, pp. 269-89, ibid.
Although the court appears to have recognized the futility of talking about "retail
profits," it does recite the figures presented by the Government that "retail profits"
ranged from 6.3 to 11 per cent of A&P's total profits in the years 1939-41. 173 F.2d
79, 86 (7th Cir. 1949).
49. 173 F.2d 79, 85 (7th Cir. 1949).
50. See Adelman, supra note 47.
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raising the price in others.5 This is a question of fact, not logic. A&P could
raise the price in Area Y after lowering it in Area X only if it were free from
competitive pressures in Area Y. Did A&P in fact have such a position in
any divisional area? Despite the court's acceptance of the argument, there
is no evidence to indicate it.52
Generalized, the issue of whether a company has a monopolistic status
in any phase of its system is central to any case involving vertical or horizon-
tal integration. If, for example, ACCO were the only source of produce
available to A&P's retail competitors, then A&P could exercise a real
squeeze, both in price and quality. The same would be true if ACCO were
one of few dealers acting collusively. Or if A&P were the only producer of
coffee, it could manipulate the price to squeeze independent retailers. 33 But
these conditions are no more true than the implicit assumption of A&P
monopoly in particular retailing areas.
The final question-and second major issue in any integration case-is
whether the activity or growth of A&P tends toward monopoly. It is an
impressive argument that once expansion by an organization like A&P gets
going, it will cumulate until all others are driven from the field. Yet this,
too, is a question of fact. All indications in the grocery field are that the
argument is false. It is at least probative, though not conclusive, that A&P's
share of the national market declined from 11.6 to 7.1 per cent from 1933 to
1942 . 4 The highest percentage in any "local" market area was 17 in 1925,
51. 173 F.2d 79, 87 (7th Cir. 1949).
52. Of A&P's 39 "retail units" in 1941, eight handled 15 to 20 per cent of the businezs
in their respective territories; the rest of the units had less. 67 F.Supp. 626, 633 (E.D.III.
1946). In some cities (size not given), A&P had over 50 per cent. Iid. Professor Adel-
man is of the opinion that the "retail units," which were usually metropolitan districts,
approximated the true economic market areas, and that the 20 per cent figure represents
the upper limit of A&P's market control. Supra note 33. It is suggested that even if
A&P's control in certain areas were 50, 60 or 70 per cent, there would still be no effective
monopoly position unless there were tacit collusion between A&P and other retailers-
and there was none. As in connection with buying markets, supra note 40, contrast the
"parallel" behavior of sellers found in American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 32-8 U.S.
781 (1946).
The Government's case against A&P w:as characterized by a notable lack of actual
price data, essential to any substantial conclusions regarding discriminatory price-cutting.
For a thorough investigation of another chain's selling policies, which was based on
price data, see Cassady & Grether, Locality Price Differentials it; the lWestcrn Rctail
Grocery Trade, 21 HAnv. Bus. REv. 190 (1943). The authors concluded that there was
no true price discrimination, that ". . . the price differentials between cities seem to b2
explainable, directly, by the policy of meeting competition item by item and, indirectly, by
variations in merchandise costs between regions." Id. at 205.
53. Compare the control of the "majors" over transport facilities in the oil industry.
RosTow, A NATIONAL POLICY FOR THE OIL IsNusMr 57-66 (1943).
54. 67 F.Supp. 626, 633 (E.D.Ill.1946). Chain store taxes may have contributed to
this decline, but since the percentage of market covered by chain stores generally stayed
about the same for this period, ibid., the effect vas probably minor.
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20.5 in 1938 and 19.8 in 1941.11 Other chains, cooperatives and independent
super-markets show no signs of impending extinction. Even small retailers
persist in large numbers, some because of strenuous efforts at efficiency, some
because large numbers of consumers still like service extras and "quality"
products. 6 The cardinal characteristic of the whole field is relative freedom
of entry, an almost insuperable barrier to anything resembling monopoly."
The case against A&P dwindles to narrow grounds, and if anything they
are Section 1 matters, not Section 2. The Company received concessions in
price which were not available to others-a minor sin that has beneficial
effects on prices in general-and perhaps it occasionally indulged in unduly
severe price reductions. But as a foray against invidious monopoly power,
the A&P case is a parade of mistakes.
Strangely enough, the verdict is not likely to have serious effects on A&P
or give lasting succor to its competitors. Although the Seventh Circuit's
opinion is not entirely clear, the heart of the complaint against A&P's as-
sorted activities seems to be the price concessions gained in buying. The
goal of price concessions makes the "boycotts" of uncooperative sellers bad.
The fruits of price concessions, in the court's view, make "selling below cost"
possible and (therefore?) bad. So A&P can no longer get price concessions
unless in fact they are offered on "equal terms" to other buyers. But it can
minimize the effects of this admonition by turning progressively to its private
brands, either manufacturing its own requirements or buying the entire
output of small producers for sale under its own labels.
Such a development would not create joy in the ranks of big-name sellers.
It would take away the one small gain that competitors of A&P could hope
to secure from the case. The principal advantages held by A&P and other
chains-efficiency in handling and selling-are virtually untouched anyway.
55. See Adelman, supra note 33. It was not A&P but independents who initiated the
super-market. A&P and other chains were forced to emulate them, both to meet the new
competition and to reduce the impact of chain-store taxes based on the number of units,
HOFFMAN, at 10. The shift-over involved the closing of over 7,000 stores from 1937 to
1941. Reply Brief for Appellants, Part II, page 450, 173 F2d 79 (7th Cir. 1949).
Moreover, A&P has abandoned at least 1000 towns since 1933. 67 F.Supp. 626, 641
(E.D.Ill.1946).
56. See MnLEiz, UxFAm Co mPmitoN 169 (1941). From 1933 to 1943, the percentage
of sales made by independent (non-chain) retailers rose from 61.7 to 70.2 per cent. 67
F.Supp. 626, 633 (E.D.Ill.1946).
"The nearest thing we ever have had to monopoly in grocery retailing ... was the
old village grocery store. The prices which it charged were not elastic and usually not
very competitive until the automobile made them so." HorFMAx, at 160.
57. ". .. [E]ven granting the possibility of eliminating rivals by means of local
price-cutting, the retail field is so easy to enter that, when this purging process had been
completed and prices had been raised, new rivals very likely would enter the field again al-
most immediately, with the result that all the effort would have gone for naught. This latter
situation is particularly true in the grocery field, since normally stocks of merchandise
and facilities are easily obtained." Cassady & Grether, supra note 52, at 206.
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As for consumers, let them be excused for a secret hope that mass distribu-
tors will not suffer in the future from this odd twist in the law.
The Company has dropped the case, perhaps because two lower courts
have interpreted the facts adversely, or perhaps because the burdens im-
posed by it are lighter than the trouble of further appeal. Until the Govern-
ment sees fit to bring another case of similar ilk, the Supreme Court is saved
from the pressing tasks of settling the effect of the Robinson-Patman Act
and of clarifying the doctrine of monopoly power itself. A civil action, seek-
ing dissolution of massed buying power, would make these two questions
inescapable.
Are the provisions of the Robinson-Patman Act relevant in defining viola-
tions under the Sherman Act? They are with respect to Section 1 of the
Sherman Act, but the effect they should have is not so clear. Section I deals
with activities and patterns of behavior-some, like price-fixing, being con-
sidered so clearly unjustifiable as to be illegal per se; C3 others being treated
as subject to the "rule of reason" and thus illegal only in particular con-
texts.5 9 Under the view illustrated by the Seventh Circuit in the A&P case,
obtaining a price advantage by inducing sellers to violate a statutory pro-
hibition is in the class of per se illegality. But the view is not an inevitable
one. If this type of price discrimination is looked on as a more or less in-
cidental result of a buyer's legitimate efforts to get a price reduction, then
it would be inappropriate to say that the buyer has acted in unreasonable
restraint of trade.
Relevant as the Robinson-Patman Act may be to Section 1 of the Sherman
Act, it is almost completely unrelated to the issue now dominating Sec-
tion 2-the existence of an illegal kind or degree of monopoly power. De-
pending on the nature of the market, price discrimination may be a symptom
either of repressive monopoly or vigorous (though "monopolistic") competi-
tion. Violations of the Robinson-Patman Act, therefore, cannot determine
whether or not under the New Sherman Act the remedy of divestiture or
dissolution should be appliedc)
The clarification of the monopoly power doctrine itself must be in terms of
the central purpose of the Sherman Act-the protection and promotion
of active competition. The opposition to bigness, most recently stressed
in the vigorous dissent to the Columbia Steel decision, has been aimed at
power which puts "control of prices" into the hands of "a few self-appointed
men." 61 This is not the kind of power possessed by A&P. The contrast is a
useful guide in refining the doctrine of monopoly power. A large integrated
58. E.g., United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
59. E.g., Sugar Institute v. United States, 297 U.S. 553 (1936).
60. In monopoly cases, divestiture or dissolution has now become "an essential
feature" of civil decrees. See Schine Theatres, Inc. v. United States, 334 U.S. 110, 1Z3
(1948).
61. United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495, 536 (194S) (dissenting
opinion).
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